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To those children who suffer(ed) bullying at school for being putos (fags) or marimachos (butch women) 
–both the survivors and the others... 
  
 
1. Introduction: Understanding the (incomplete) Uruguayan path from harassment to the 
(public) “re-subjectivization” of queers 
 
“Montevideo’s main Plaza Independencia has palaces, a statue of the nation’s founder, vendors and a 
gay bar”  
Toronto Star, March 14, 20091 
The transition from being the object of humiliation of heterosexist discourse, to being a 
subject who transforms the horror suffered into (self) creation (“resubjectivization”) - the main 
motif of Didier Eribon’s Réflexions sur la question gay (1999) - somehow describes what many 
queers have experienced in Uruguay in recent years, not only as individuals but also, and 
especially, as a collective. Even though, as is superbly captured in the famous metaphors of the 
Uruguayan thinker Real de Azúa (1984) (“shock absorber society”, “the impulse and its 
containment”), Uruguay is seen and analyzed as a country in which extremes are avoided and 
“time goes by slowly”, its “metropolitan coming out” (Sinfield, 2000) has been deep and 
relatively fast. These days, Montevideo seems, to many and different observers, an “open 
environment” – a “queer-friendly place” (Sempol, 2008).2  In this sense, the country in which I 
grew up is very different from that which I left some months ago.3 
                                                 
1 http://www.thestar.com/comment/columnists/article/600522    
2 To see how this social opening operates at the level of the “pink dollar” see http://www.viajessunlight.com 
3 As a gay intellectual who faced systematic discrimination and even so-called bullying almost my entire 
(educational) life, my feelings and thoughts are contradictory. It is still “strange” (I have not found a better 
expression yet) to see these fast shifts in the dynamics and meanings of diverse realms and spaces (from streets to 
schools) in queer lives and, especially, in the attitude of heterosexual people. I want to emphasize that the question 
of what to do collectively with the painful scars caused by past collective abuses and discrimination will remain even 
after a hard-to-imagine total suppression of queer-phobia and sexism. It must: the theme addressed here is anchored 
in bodies, memories and subjectivities; it is anchored in the suffering of many. My analytical and epistemological 
perspective (Casen and Ravecca, 2009; Ravecca, 2007; Ravecca and Casen, 2008) follows a general feature of queer 
literature in its most reflexive and radical versions, where thought and life are neither artificially segmented nor 
3 
In the following pages I offer a basic interpretation of this recent and incomplete “queering 
of Uruguay”. I do so using two moments of explanation: the structure and the conjuncture of the 
country. I am not using these terms in a conceptually complex way. By “structure” I refer to the 
historical trajectory and some main stable features of Uruguay that (I will argue) are helpful for 
“making sense” of the issues addressed here. From this starting point, we will be ready to look at 
what is going on today, and here again it is necessary to choose a window, a point of view: in 
this case, the spectacular growth in visibility of queer social movements and their success in 
putting sexual diversity issues onto the social and institutional agenda (Aguilar Villanueva, 1992; 
1992b & 1992c). But this achievement cannot be understood without considering the arrival of 
the “progressive” Frente Amplio (Broad Front) to government in 2004. Thus, I will explore the 
articulation among queer social movements, public policy and state discourse.  
In the conclusion I will try to go beyond the understandable celebration of this (partial) 
opening by critically exploring some possible problematic implications of this specific 
incorporation of queerness into the nation. Throughout, I contend with the scarcity of academic 
research and literature on this topic, the novelty of this terrain of reflection in Uruguay, and (in 
the case of the conjuncture) the recentness of the process under analysis; thus, the reader will 
find I take only some preliminary steps in the directions indicated. 
2. Structure and history: Some basic features and moments of Uruguay. Glocal contexts 
and temporalities of this queer story 
Latin America is an extremely heterogeneous continent. The trend, common in the so-
called Global North, to make strong statements about “Latin America” as a whole, is extremely 
problematic.4  I consider it relevant that it is from Canada that I am making this contribution 
toward understanding the situation of queer people in Uruguay, as Uruguay is a space generally 
                                                                                                                                                             
“con-fused”. Thus, I consider it important to make explicit this (for a lack of a better word) “subjective” dimension, 
since it will be operating on each page of this paper (and because, as many authors have shown from different 
approaches, we tend to forget too easily). On the issue of bullying in primary schools and high schools in 
Montevideo, see Contreras (2008). 
4 An example of this in the terrain of sexuality is Nesvig (2001), which refers to “Latin American homosexuality” 
while working only on three or four national contexts. As always, there is a problem of “positionality” – who speaks 
about what or whom, and from what place. I am not claiming the privilege of “native knowledge”, but I do share 
Cooper (1994)’s concerns about the power operations implied in “external” discourses and views, especially if they 
come from a “self-represented” privileged space and they do not take careful methodological, theoretical and 
empirical measures with each interpretative step. 
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absent from the reflection and research of Canadians.5 Thus, this article must confront the 
challenge of speaking to two very different audiences: the Uruguayan academy, which is not 
generally familiar with the theoretical frameworks I employ; and the Canadian academy, which 
is very distant from Uruguay and tends to “imagine” Latin American countries in ways that must 
be problematized.  
With a surface area of 177.410 square kilometers and a population of three-and-a-half 
million, Uruguay is located in the southeastern corner of Latin America, between two of the most 
powerful nations of the region: Argentina and Brazil. Its main colonial background is Spanish 
but it was the scene of battles between different empires (Portugal, Spain and England) and 
among its neighbors. In fact, its independence, achieved in 1830, was at least partially caused by 
the operations in the region of the British official Lord Ponsomby. Several historians have shown 
that Ponsomby saw the creation of a country “in the middle”, between Brazil and the United 
Provinces (today’s Argentina), as needed to pacify the region while imposing conditions 
advantageous to British interests. The notion of “state cap” (an independent territory between 
two powerful states) was an explicit goal; a common joke in Uruguay is to call the country 
“Ponsomby-land”. Thus, in many senses, Uruguay was born transnational and, as I will show, 
has remained in that condition to the present, when the arrival of the leftist Frente Amplio to 
government is only interpretable in the context of the Latin American turn to the left. 6   
In the following paragraphs I describe some historical features that are key to 
understanding the works of Uruguayan (homo)sexuality.  
The absence of masses of indigenous people “apt to be subjected to servitude” (Real de 
Azúa, 1984: 18), their resistance to the colonizers and the lack of gold in the area explain the late 
and weak consolidation of the colony and the absence of a strong tradition of evangelization. 
Thus, the weakness of the Catholic Church and the non-existence of an Oligarchy in the 
traditional Latin American sense of the term are two main features of “longue durée” (Braudel) 
                                                 
5 In fact, I have been exploring the research interests of an enormous number of Canadian experts on Latin America 
and have not yet identified any Uruguay specialists. 
6 Historian Gerardo Caetano (1993) explains: “The ‘inside’ of Uruguayans historically has been very interpenetrated 
by the ‘outside’. The borders between these dimensions are blurred” (“el de los uruguayos ha sido históricamente un 
«adentro» muy interpenetrado por el «afuera», en donde las fronteras entre una y otra dimensión resultan borrosas”). 
The translation is mine. See: http://www.rau.edu.uy/mercosur/caetano.htm. 
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in Uruguayan history (Caetano, 1993). The process of murdering “heterosexualization”, 
conceptually developed by Alexander (2005), did not take place in Uruguay as elsewhere. 
However, genocide was not absent from Uruguay’s story: the scant aboriginal population was 
not evangelized, but was killed by the descendants of the Spanish - the criollos (creole people).  
The 19th century was extremely violent in Uruguay. The two main political parties – the 
Blanco (White) and Colorado (Red) parties, among the oldest in the world - were frequently at 
war and the countryside, inhabited by gauchos and the scant native population, was a not a 
regulated space in formal-institutional terms: the enclosure of the fields took place in the late 
1800’s. Abundant space, sparse population, and a relatively egalitarian social reality have shaped 
the public sphere ever since.  
The state was extremely weak, “almost an illusion” (Filgueira, Garcé, Ramos and Yaffé: 
2003), until 1875, when a process of institutional consolidation and modernization began under 
military government. Paradoxically, the authoritarian regime of Máximo Santos allowed for the 
secular expansion of public education, spearheaded by the celebrated reformer José Pedro Varela 
(“public, free and mandatory education” was his motto). This process of secularization, among 
the most important in Latin America, was completed by the democratic governments of the first 
part of the 20th century. In 1907, with the military defeat of the Blanco Party, the state was 
consolidated in Weberian terms; it attained a “monopoly over legitimate physical violence” 
(Weber, 1991). 
A new stage in the life of the country had begun: the Colorado Party would govern 
Uruguay for a long period, and the country would become one of the most consolidated, stable 
and strong democracies in the region and beyond (Moreira et al, 2008, among many others). The 
previously noted sociological configuration, especially the absence of an oligarchic group, is 
central to understanding this period: the political elites were relatively distinct from the dominant 
social classes (Serna, 2006 & 2007) and developed a relatively strong welfare state that touched 
national life in all aspects.7 Batllismo, the most “progressive” fraction of the Colorado Party 
                                                 
7 The literature on this point is enormous. A small selection of (very different) examples: Filgueira and Filgueira, 
1994; Filgueira, Garcé, Ramos and Yaffé, 2003; Jung and Ravecca, 2008; Lanzaro, 1986; Moreira, 1997 & 2007; 
Moreira et al, 2008; Moreira and Ravecca, 2008; Rama, 1989, etc. The literature on political national history is 
extensive too. I think that the already classic works of José Pedro Barrán and Benjamín Nahúm, and those of 
6 
whose most important leader was José Batlle y Ordóñez (1903-1907, 1911-1915), played a 
fundamental role: to be clear but simplistic, Batllismo embodied a social democratic project that 
had to negotiate/struggle with “conservative” forces – both inside and outside the Colorado 
Party, especially the Blanco Party. Batllismo, which was quite anti-clerical, completed the 
process of secularization,8 and passed “advanced” social and labor laws – for example, it 
legalized the right of women to sue for divorce (1907 and 1913). During the period 1933-1935, 
abortion was legal, but it was criminalized again due to strong conservative opposition (Sempol, 
2008).   
During the first half of the 20th century, Uruguay was imagined as an extended urban and 
cultured “middle class” –a concept that included the working class in a “hyper-integrated” 
configuration (Real de Azúa, 1984; Rama, 1989). Batllismo’s ideological complexity was noted 
by several historians. On this point, Diego Sempol, a Uruguayan historian and queer activist, 
made an interesting comment: 
I think that Batllismo was not only a political but a cultural phenomenon that 
expressed an ideological and philosophical point of view, which, in its most 
radical expressions (the case of Domingo Arena), promoted free love, divorce by 
women’s choice, abortion, education and anti-clericalism. Today’s progressive 
project9 lacks that ideological substratum to address sexual diversity issues, and 
that is why it represents a sort of reconfiguration of Batllismo in its means, but 
without reaching the radical levels reached by that earlier political current.  
This comparison between the political elite of the old Colorado Party (which today, as we 
will see, is located on the right side of the ideological spectrum) and the current leftist 
government led by the Frente Amplio, created in 1971, which has come to occupy the 
ideological space of traditional Batllismo, is very telling. We could say that “the past” – or at 
least some manifestations of Batllismo – was more radical than the present project of the Frente 
                                                                                                                                                             
Caetano and Rilla, provide a general approximation. Real de Azúa’s books are essential to understanding any aspect 
of Uruguayan society.   
8 The Catholic Church, displaced from the management of hospitals and schools, was definitely weakened as agent 
of socialization.   
9 In 1994 the Frente Amplio formed a coalition with other minor electoral forces. It changed its name, incorporating 
the expression “Encuentro Progresista” (Progressive Encounter). Eventually, the name changed again but this 
expression remains in common use. Here, when Sempol refers to the “progressive project”, he is simply using the 
name of the coalition, which does not imply necessarily that he considers it progressive. In fact, the shift from 
“leftist” language to a “progressive” one implied a shift to the center. 
7 
Amplio. The latter, due to changes to the electoral system in 1996, had to shift to the center to 
gain sufficient votes to win the presidency (Garcé and Yaffé, 2005; Yaffé, 2005). Note that, 
additionally, this coalition of parties was formed by former members of the Blanco and the 
Colorado Parties, Christian-democrats, Communists, Socialists, ex-guerrillas, etc. The Marxist 
and Catholic legacies that colored its political orientation imposed limitations on how it has 
addressed sexual diversity issues. However, it is still necessary to acknowledge that the Frente 
Amplio was the political force that, while recovering “discursively and in fact” the welfare state, 
finally opened the institutional door to the queer agenda.  
The Colorado Party, then, founded the welfare state, and its major faction, Batllismo, laid 
the groundwork for a (relatively, in the context of Latin America) “equal national gender 
regime.” The main historical electoral and social forces opposing the welfare state (i.e., the 
Blanco Party, some sectors of the Colorado Party and the Church) were also more conservative 
in the social realm. In this sense, I think that this specific historical case demands a critical 
interrogation of some assumptions of what the state means in terms of sexuality in the world’s 
periphery (Wallerstein, 1975). For example, in Alexander (2005), Puar (2007) and Wekker 
(2006), among others, the state is generally conceived as a “provider of (hetero-normative and 
sexist) violence”. This perspective can be, paradoxically (and despite the authors’ intentions), 
functional to the neoliberal project, especially in Latin America, where it is hard to imagine a 
serious contestation of capitalism and other oppressive social relations and structures without the 
state.10  Briefly: state politics-centered Uruguayan society had, among the forces that built this 
public sensibility towards the state and the public sphere, the “queerest” discourse/project given 
the historical and national context. In Uruguay the state is “progressive”; the non-state is 
regressive or irrelevant. (Of course, I do not mean to imply the absence of other spaces of action; 
indeed, I am looking precisely at the articulation of state politics with other spaces.) 
The “Switzerland of America” (as Uruguay was known) was, however, also a “regressive” 
discursive entity/project: it did not regret the country’s being marked by the “absence” of native 
people and, in fact, many Uruguayans used to be proud of this characteristic. The extermination 
of the scant aboriginal population permitted the image of a homogeneous and “manageable” 
                                                 
10 Even in Bolivia, where social movements play a huge political role, it is precisely their connection with the state 
that enables their project of socio-political change (Casen and Ravecca, 2008). 
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country: “geographically tiny, inhabited by a small population that is more integrated spatially, 
racially and socially than any other part of Latin America” (Real de Azúa, 1984: 14). It is easy to 
see the radically racist dimension of this “ideal”.11  
Undoubtedly, the modernization/ disciplinary societal project described in detail by Barrán 
(1993), pursued between 1860 and 1920, was Eurocentric (and still hetero-sexist and hetero-
normative, despite its “progressive” aspects). Not only was it based on the extermination of 
aboriginals but also on discrimination against Afro-Uruguayans.12 I think it important to explore 
the possible connections between the historical “symbolic space” occupied by the “racial(ized) 
other”, and the current incorporation of queers in Uruguay: in what subtle ways does the past 
dominate the present (Braudel, 1985)? I will briefly address this issue in section III.13  
2.1 Politics and social welfare: the interconnection. 
Uruguay is part of the so-called Global South (or “periphery”, in Wallersteinean language), 
having a structurally dependent economy. However, the myth of its being the “Switzerland of 
America” was built on real foundations. It has been (and still is) the most egalitarian country of 
the continent, as shown by the Gini Index in Chart 1.  
The Uruguayan Human Development Report of 2008 asserts that “Uruguay was and still is 
a country with relatively high levels of human development for the region. Known as the 
                                                 
11 “During an important period of their history, Uruguayans represented their nation as a European island in Latin 
America. In the same manner, they have been proud of not having an indigenous population, presenting themselves 
as a society of whites with a homogeneous Eurocentric matrix. A society ‘is’ also what it believes it is, and ours has 
generally cultivated the myth of our ancestors as exclusively comprised of “men who descended from ships”, 
slighting and undervaluing other racial and cultural legacies, such as those of the blacks and the Indians” (Caetano, 
1993). http://www.rau.edu.uy/mercosur/caetano.htm The translation is mine. “Indian” (“indio”) is not considered a 
racist or offensive term in Uruguay.  
12 Alfaro (1998) has challenged Barran´s perspective on the “disciplining of society”, by looking at resistance to 
(and the multi-layered appropriations of) this project. She shows that if the carnival (a traditional “uncivilized” 
cultural expression) was disciplined, at the same time discipline was “carnivalized” in various ways too. 
13 Despite the contemporary efforts of the most important Uruguayan queer social movement, Ovejas Negras (Black 
Sheep), to address the issue of racism, in my opinion the queer community can be/is being integrated basically via 
the concept of the “metropolitan” gay (Sinfield, 2000), which fits with the imagined white urban middle class citizen 
of Batllismo. I think that Uruguay exemplifies the effects of a radically paradoxical discourse, as theorized by 
Foucault (polyvalence of discourse) and Laclau and Mouffe (2004). 
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American Switzerland, it was characterized by early modernization, the development of a social 
state advanced for its time, and early democratic consolidation”14 (Moreira et al, 2008: 129). 
To interpret the “conjuncture”, I consider it necessary to examine the phenomenon 
mentioned in this quotation: the highly institutionalized democracy of Uruguay (Mainwaring and 
Scully: 1995). The report states that the traditional Uruguayan parties built a strong tradition of 
democratic stability and welfare policies. 
There are no differing opinions on this issue: “politics”, in the traditional sense, are central 
to understanding the relatively good human development performance of Uruguay. Considering 
our understanding of Uruguay as a state politics-centered society, it is difficult to imagine an 
emancipatory project not “filtered” or enacted by institutional actors. In fact, the way in which 
this article addresses queerness in present-day Uruguay is a symptom of this fact: Uruguay 
cannot be understood without a consideration of its political parties.15  
  
                                                 
14 “El Uruguay fue y sigue siendo un país de alto desarrollo humano relativo en el concierto de los países de la 
región. Conocido como la Suiza de América, se caracterizó por una modernización temprana, el desarrollo de un 
Estado social de avanzada para su época y una precoz consolidación democrática”. The translation is mine.  
15 I would note another feature: Uruguayan democratic political culture tends to be more leftist than in other 
countries in Latin America. There is an anecdote about a social meeting in which Ricardo Lagos, the former 
President of Chile, said: “the Uruguayan right-wing is at the center, and their center is on the left”. Even though the 
statement is simplistic it is not by chance that this important politician perceives the Uruguayan context in this way. 
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Chart 1. Gini index by country (Showing latest available data) 
Rank  Countries  Amount 
(top to bottom) 
#6  Bolivia  60.6 
#11  Brazil:  56.7 
#15  Mexico  54.6 
#16  Colombia  53.8 
#17  Chile  53.8 
#28  Peru  49.8 
#30  Argentina  48.3 
#34  Costa Rica  46.5 
#37  Uruguay  45.2 
#39  United States  45 
#70  United Kingdom  36.8 
#121  Sweden  25 
#122  Denmark  23.2 
 Weighted average  40.5 
Definition: This index measures the degree of inequality in the distribution of family income in a country. 
The index is calculated from the Lorenz curve, in which cumulative family income is plotted against the 
number of families arranged from the poorest to the rich. 
 
Source: CIA World Factbook, 14 June, 2007 
 
2.2 The fall and the warriors: the 60´s 
The violence of the 19th century ended with the military defeat of Aparicio Saravia 
(Blanco Party) in 1907, with which the Uruguayan state achieved the most important Weberian 
requirement of statehood. In the following decades, Uruguayan society tended to have a very 
exalted self-perception. The World Wars allowed certain economic welfare even in the absence 
of a sustainable planned path for development. The elites, during the so-called period of “second 
Batllismo” (1942-1958), tended to be more irresponsible with the management of the state, 
colonizing it via “rings of clientelism”. For instance, there was a spectacular increase in the 
number of civil servants between 1941 and 1955. Some intellectuals (called the “critical 
generation” by Rama, 1972) used to say that Uruguay was dreaming in many and problematic 
ways, and that its waking would be terrible. They were right. Uruguayan multidimensional 
“exceptionalism” reached its limits in the second half of the 20th century (Filgueira and 
Filgueira, 1994; Rama, 1989). A traumatic process began, through which the country may still be 
passing. Symptomatic of this is the fact that the Uruguayan intelligentsia commonly thinks about 
the country through the notion of “crisis” (Paternain, 2002). 
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Uruguay’s process of industrialization never surpassed the agro-export model and, when 
the terms of international exchange became disadvantageous, it was affected tremendously. 
During the 1960’s, the social situation became more and more tense, polarized and even 
agonistic. In the context of the Cold War and political polarization in Latin America, the 
imperialist foreign policy of the United States became extremely aggressive. Leftist forces were 
not very powerful in the electoral arena and, most of the time, they were divided (into the 
Socialist Party, the Communist Party and other groups). A minority, called the Tupamaros, 
considered la lucha armada (armed struggle) the only possible path to socialism and initiated a 
guerilla struggle. In response, the national government developed authoritarian security policies 
and militarized the battle against this guerrilla force. This step strengthened the military, giving 
to them a political role that they had never undertaken before. In 1971, the legal forces of the left 
created the Frente Amplio, and in 1972 the guerrilla (which never took the control of any part of 
the country –it was an “urban guerrilla” force) was definitively defeated. However, the objective 
of conservative forces and the US was not to defend democracy: they were defending capitalism. 
So, in 1973 an extremely violent, anti-communist (and anti-leftist in general) dictatorship was 
established. A huge general strike could not avert this fate. 
2.3 The dictatorship (1973-1985): a new global order and (militaristic) hyper-masculinity 
Numerous scholarly works have been written about the cruelest regime that Uruguay has 
known in modern history. However, sex and gender scarcely have been discussed in this 
scholarship, and –of course− queer views and memories are absolutely absent from the literature. 
At least some authors have been thinking about the period in a way that goes beyond the most 
traditional approaches: in terms of its deeply multilayered effects on people’s lives. The whole of 
society was scrutinized, controlled, raped, tortured, and even “disappeared”. Private space and 
the cultural realm were disrupted (Cosse and Markarián, 1996; Gil and Viñar, 1998; Giorgi, 
1995). I want to stress an important project called Memoria para armar (Memory for 
assembling) which pulls together the written testimonies of women who experienced the 
dictatorship in different ways. The collected views are as diverse as the individuals and life itself. 
Those testimonies are invaluable for producing meaning about the period through the concept of 
gender and beyond. I would say that they “do theory”. One salient aspect of these testimonies is 
that they reflect the complexity of the context about which they talk. For example, they reveal 
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how military men and leftist militants shared some discursive logic in terms of gender and the 
body, though the difference between them was enormous.  
For the leftist organizations, the body was an instrument of political activity –eventually, it 
should be sacrificed for “the cause”. The “discourse of the warrior” and of class struggle did not 
recognize gender in any form. Regarding “homosexuality”, the situation was worse: Marxists 
and fascists used to employ similar language. However, again, complexity must be 
acknowledged; if Marxism needs a reorientation in practice and theory to abandon its hyper-
masculinist discourse, a simple comparison of militant and military bodies is enough to discover 
the difference. The leftist militants had beards, long hair, undisciplined bodies (thin, unworked); 
they represented a kind of “mixed body” in which the “feminization” of 1968 was expressed. 
The “body fascism” of the dictatorship, on the other hand, was fixated on gendered roles; the 
dictatorship hysterically “cleaned”, “fixed” and “gendered” bodies.   
Spanish colonization, the neocolonial state and empire-building share a tough approach to 
gender regulation in terms of violent heterosexualization (Alexander, 2007). In the case of 
Uruguay, the dictatorship not only tortured and killed leftist militants, but imposed a clearly 
gendered regime in the schools (textbooks, uniforms, hair, and attitude) and developed a 
repressive discourse explicitly opposed to the relatively open environment of the sixties. If the 
building of the Republic itself implied the extermination of native people and a public sphere 
conducted basically by men, the dictatorship tried to impose a discourse in which communism 
was alien to “our society” and the strong men, the military, saved us from that foreign form of 
depravation. Schools were a very sensitive space in this regard. Extremely conservative 
“teachers” of “Moral and Civic Education” lectured about the appropriate behavior of women, 
their desirable subordination towards men and the necessary sexual division of duties and rights. 
Male students had to wear their hair very short, while jeans were prohibited and gendered 
uniforms imposed. As documented in the shocking report on human rights violations during the 
dictatorship, entitled Nunca Más (“Never Again”) (SERPAJ, 1989), sexuality also played an 
important role in torture. Many political prisoners were raped –both women and men. The notion 
of “breaking” the masculinity of the male militant was always implied. However, it seems that 
women have been more able to talk about the uses of sexuality in prison. I can only wonder 
about the deep implications of all of this for thinking through the layers of Uruguayan 
(homo)sexuality.  
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In their social project, the military failed in almost every respect imaginable16: the 
dictatorship did not build anything durable; it only destroyed and traumatized. The Uruguayan 
people rejected the army’s Constitutional project in a plebiscite in 1980: though in the grip of 
fear and terror, still they voted against the military regime. After the democratic transition, the 
political system seemed to be intact: the same configuration, with similar political forces. Some 
authors have argued that the democratic transition restored the past more than ushering in a new 
future. In leftist militant culture the narratives about “the people” against “the military” excluded 
again the diversity of the people. Social battles were masculinized through the notion of “heroes” 
(political prisoners) who resisted “terrible tortures” with dignity (Sempol, 2008). At least these 
identities had their language and their narrative: others were without words, silent. Regarding the 
abuses suffered by queer people during the dictatorship and the transition, see Sempol (2008). 
 Julio María Sanguinetti, one of the most important contemporary leaders of the Colorado 
Party, became the President of the transition period (1984-1989). Since then, the Colorado 
(1994-2004) and Blanco Party (1989-1994) have governed in turn sharing in general terms an 
increasingly neoliberalized script. 
3. Conjuncture: Frente Amplio’s first government and the Ovejas Negras.17 Politics, 
policies and discourse 
Over the period spanning the ideologically polarized sixties, the dictatorship (1973-1984), 
the transition to democracy (1985-1990), the long neoliberal decade (1990-2004), and the worst 
financial crisis in the country’s history (2002), the Uruguayan polis was deeply eroded –with 
rising levels of inequality rates being a symptom/metaphor of this process.  
The Frente Amplio, an extremely institutionalized coalition composed of center-left and 
leftist parties and movements, gained votes consistently since 1971: it has governed the capital of 
the country since 1989, and in 2004 it won the national elections without need of a second 
                                                 
16 This is one of the differences between the Uruguayan regime and Pinochet’s: the latter was as cruel as the 
Uruguayan dictatorship, but it succeeded in “re-drawing” Chilean society in extremely neoliberal and conservative 
terms. 
17 Ovejas Negras (Black Sheep) is the largest queer advocacy group in Uruguay. I consider it unnecessary to explain 
the serious (political) joke implied in the name. 
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ballot.18 This is a completely unprecedented political situation. Chart 2 shows the electoral 
evolution of Uruguay from 1971 to 2004 (1973-1984 is the dictatorial period). 
The Colorado Party has been shifting constantly to the right of the ideological spectrum. 
The Foro Batllista (Batllista Forum), the least conservative of its fractions in the post-
authoritarian period, has lost electoral ground. Recently, the son of the ex-dictator Juan María 
Bordaberry, the neoliberal and Catholic Pedro Bordaberry, has become an important leader and 
probably will be the Colorado Party’s Presidential candidate for 2009.19 The Blanco Party has 
structural links to the Catholic Church, and the majority of its leaders are known to be 
homophobic and sexist. This means that, in contemporary Uruguay, there is “correspondence” 
between neoliberalism and social conservatism, which makes the development of a “neoliberal 
queer discourse” almost impossible −at least in the institutional realm. Both parties have always 
rejected the queer agenda. In contrast, the Frente Amplio was born with radical purposes 
(agrarian reform, a wide program of nationalization, etc.) and eventually shifted to the center. 
Today, we could say that, contrary to neoliberal dogma, it seeks to “bring the state back” 
(Skocpol) and to recuperate the legacy of Batllismo. The post-1990 crisis of Marxism as a 
theoretical frame for political action, and the necessity of electoral growth (especially with the 
new electoral system), have been seen as a window of opportunity for the incorporation of other 
struggles and subjects, beyond those that are class-centered. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 The constitutional reform of 1996 introduced the ballotage (also known as second ballot or runoff voting): since 
then, if no party attains 50% of the vote in the first round, there is a second ballot. This allows the “traditional 
parties” (Blanco and Colorado) to vote together against the Frente Amplio. The reform had the obvious political 
intention of preventing the latter from winning the presidential elections at the time, and it was successful. However, 
it had the paradoxical effect of consolidating the left, which, because it never before occupied government, was seen 
as the only hope for real change. This reform electorally polarized the political system, and, at the “end of the game” 
(Moreira, 2004), produced a very powerful center-left government.   
19 This article was written before July 28 2009, when the primary elections took place. In fact, Pedro Bordaberry 
will be the Colorado Party’s next presidential candidate. He obtained a historic result: more than 70% of the votes.  
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Chart 2. Electoral evolution in Uruguay (percentage of votes) 
 1971 1984 1989 1994 1999 1999 (2nd Turn) 2004 
Colorado Party 40.9 41.2 30.3 32.3 32.8 54.1 10.6 
Blanco Party  40.2 35.0 38.9 31.2 22.3 --- 36,7 
Frente Amplio 18.3 21.3 21.2 30.6 40.1 45.9 51.7 
Other parties 0.6 2.5 9.4 5.9 4.8 --- 1.0 
Source: Moreira and Ravecca (2008) 
 
Thus, Uruguay, one of the oldest democracies in the world, remains a very political place 
in the traditional sense.20 With a weak civil society and a strong and institutionalized public 
space, it is hard to imagine any emancipatory project/process not led or at least co-led by the 
political parties, especially the center-left Frente Amplio, in which are still concentrated the most 
progressive Uruguayan political forces. Given this structure of opportunity, the strongest and 
most politically progressive queer advocacy group, Ovejas Negras, has been working intensively 
with the new government, operating cunningly within “the not-so-large social space available for 
civil society in Uruguay” (Sempol, interview). I argue that the characteristics of both the Frente 
Amplio and Ovejas Negras produced a “positive” articulation between them (not without limits), 
which has resulted in important shifts at different levels: state discourse on (homo)sexuality, 
concrete policies, and the empowerment of queer social movements. At this point it is necessary 
to look more closely at the Ovejas Negras. 
Created in 2004, Ovejas Negras is the largest queer advocacy group in the history of 
Uruguay.21 Some of its characteristics explain its political and social success. As I will show, it 
has various strengths and its ideological tendencies facilitated its engagement with the current 
government.  
First of all, Ovejas Negras members are aware of the “precarious site” that the lgttbq 
agenda occupies in Uruguayan society, so they connect their agenda, theoretically and 
practically, with other civil society struggles and subjects: afro-Uruguayan organizations, 
                                                 
20 Politics and (partisan) political identities and conversations are very present in Uruguayan lives (Caetano, 1987; 
Caetano, Gallardo and Rilla, 1995; Moreira et al, 2008; Pérez-Antón, 1984). The public sphere concentrates 
collective narratives (the absence of successful business stories - a very common way of building identity in North 
America - is salient, for example). 
21 For an exploration of the history of the lgttbq movement in Uruguay, see Sempol (2008).  
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women’s movements, the main student union of the Public University and the powerful 
confederation of labor unions (PIT-CNT).22 Political parties (especially the Frente Amplio) are 
involved with all of these spaces. Ovejas Negras navigates different terrains comfortably: non-
traditional politics (and some of its members are “apolitical”), though it is carefully framed by its 
leadership as being “traditionally leftist”. The group is well organized into different teams 
(communication, academic, social agenda, etc.) and it boasts a significant number of active cadre 
(more than 40) to whom it has provided intellectual and practical training −and some of these 
cadres are already involved in other political spaces (the Frente Amplio, the public university, 
etc.).  
In the words of one of its members, “another distinctive feature of Ovejas Negras is its 
capacity to articulate with the political system (with the different sectors of Frente Amplio in 
particular), and to exploit politically the alliance between the Catholic Church and the Blanco 
Party [which, I would add, is the current major electoral threat to the Frente Amplio] to push (the 
left side of) Parliament into advancing the sexual diversity agenda”. Taking into account that the 
Frente Amplio holds more than 50% of the seats in the Legislative Power, if Ovejas Negras were 
able to enlist the support of an influential Member of Parliament, they would be able to become 
very strong - and this is exactly what happened. 
The Frente Amplio is internally complex and diverse, and there are huge differences 
among its fractions. Some extremely powerful (leftist) parties such as the Communist Party and 
the Movimiento de Participación Popular (Movement of Popular Participation) tend to privilege 
notions such as “class” or “people”, and to relegate “postmodern” issues (gender, sexual 
diversity, youth23) to the margins. The “moderate” La Vertiente Artiguista (Artiguist Slope) and 
the recently created Corriente de Acción y Pensamiento – Libertad, CAP-L (Stream of Action 
and Thought - Liberty) have a very different perspective on these questions –it is not by chance 
that there are members of Ovejas Negras in both. The Socialist Party seems to be in the middle: 
its youth have defended the sexual diversity cause, but this attitude is less “organic” in this case. 
                                                 
22 Note that the two last-named important and powerful organizations are typical products of the “leftist” side of 
Uruguay. 
23 This is shown by Filardo et al (2008), a research project on social and political youth organizations in Uruguay. 
The study was coordinated by the School of Social Sciences (University of the Republic) and Cotidiano Mujer 
(Everyday Women, a feminist organization). 
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Then there are influential fractions of the center-left that are not very sympathetic to queers, like 
the Alianza Progresista (Progressive Alliance). However, if we compare the Frente Amplio as a 
whole with the traditional parties, it is obvious that: 1. the Frente Amplio has a more “positive” 
political attitude towards queers; and 2. this positive attitude is concentrated at the center of the 
ideological spectrum.  
Thus, the “moderate” Vertiente Artiguista, and especially one of its senators, Margarita 
Percovich24, politically and intellectually respected by all the political parties, has played a 
central role in the production of pro-queer legislation and public policy. In the words of Diego 
Sempol: “She takes elements from feminist discourse, from her juridical advisors and from the 
legal discussions going on in Spain. Ovejas Negras worked with her, and almost all the legal 
projects were thought through and written together with her. She is always ready to support the 
cause”. This kind of “ideological and practical harmony” between an important part of the Frente 
Amplio and the lgttbq agenda has been made manifest on several occasions, from policy 
decisions to symbolic reciprocal gestures.  
One of these gestures took place in 2006 when the annual queer parade was sponsored by 
the Ministry of Public Health.25 The public, institutional medical discourse stated not only that 
sexual diversity is not pathological, but that discrimination is unacceptable; indeed, this 
discourse almost pathologized discrimination. The organizers acknowledged the members of the 
Frente Amplio who were present that day. At the same time, the motto of the event was muy 
uruguayo (“very Uruguayan”) and politics-centered, while challenging the traditional conception 
of politics: “Without diversity there is no democracy”. At the moment of the “turn to the left” in 
Latin America (Moreira and Ravecca, 2007), and in a context in which the Frente Amplio claims 
that it is building a “more inclusive democracy”, the motto was politically cunning. This entire 
symbolic scenario represents a “productive” encounter. It is not by chance that, in the survey 
conducted during the 2005 parade by Ovejas Negras, the Faculty of Social Sciences (University 
of the Republic, Uruguay), and the Queer Area of the Buenos Aires’ University (Argentina), 
among other institutions, the majority of the participants declared that they had voted for Frente 
                                                 
24  http://www.mpercovich.depolitica.com.uy   
25 Ravecca (2006) focuses on the symbolic aspects of this parade.  
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Amplio in the national elections. (In other important figures, 67% declared they had suffered 
some form of discrimination and 5% of these had been the target of physical aggression). 
Undoubtedly, such public/institutional legitimization may be seen as an accomplishment of these 
parades, which started with some tens of people participating and which today attract more than 
7000. 
In terms of concrete governmental policy and legislation, in August 2004 (with the 
Colorado Party still in office) Law Nº 17.817 (“Against racism, xenophobia and discrimination”) 
was approved, creating the Honorary Commission against Racism, Xenophobia and Other Forms 
of Discrimination –an important step in the production of a safer environment for queers. Other 
measures have been taken, but let us focus on the best known and most controversial. 
 
Chart 3. For which party did you vote? (2005 Pride Parade) 
Frente Amplio 157 
Blanco Party 10 
Colorado Party 1 
None 12 
Other party 3 
I did not vote 10 
Other 13 
Total 206 
Source: Ovejas Negras (2005) 
 
In December 2007, Uruguay became the first Latin American country to formally 
acknowledge homosexual couples at the national level. The Ley de Unión Concubinaria (Law of 
Common-law Unions), which regulates the status of both heterosexual and homosexual couples, 
was finally approved with the support of the Frente Amplio and some members of the Colorado 
Party.26 The Blanco Party maintained its homophobic and sexist discourse on “the family”, and 
                                                 
26 It defines partnership as “a situation of fact derived by the community of life between two persons –independently 
of their sex, identity, sexual orientation or preference− who maintain an exclusive, singular, stable and permanent 
sexual and affective relationship, without being married to each other” (“unión concubinaria” es “la situación de 
hecho derivada de la comunidad de vida de dos personas −cualquiera sea su sexo, identidad, orientación u opción 
sexual− que mantienen una relación afectiva de índole sexual, de carácter exclusiva, singular, estable y permanente, 
sin estar unidas por matrimonio entre sí”). 
See: http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/repartidos/AccesoRepartidos.asp?Url=/repartidos/camara/d2006090771-00.htm  
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voted against the bill. Antecedent legislation of this kind in the region had been much more 
partial, generally at the local or provincial level (as in Argentina and Mexico).  
This legal step can be seen as the incorporation of gays-lesbians as “desirable national 
subjects” (Harewood, 2005; Puar, 2007). In fact, Margarita Percovich and the most progressive 
political voices in Uruguay propose a change in the conception of “family” (“the cells of 
society”). Gays and lesbians are now protected by the law not only in a general sense, as human 
beings: now we are acknowledged in our specific condition and identity/orientation/preference 
(the three categories that appear in the law): in our way of exercising love. The Catholic Church 
and the Blanco Party imagine a different nation, one built on the basis of “traditional Uruguayan 
values”. And the conflict between these competing notions of nationhood is harmful. I remember 
when the highest authority of the Catholic Church in Uruguay, Monsignor Nicolás Cotugno, 
attacked the lgttbq community, saying that homosexuality was an “aberrant disease”. The 
responses were as strong as his statement. The leftist weekly Brecha, the most important of its 
kind in Uruguay, opened a space for members of the intelligentsia (which in general is relatively 
progressive on these issues) and the lgttbq community to express their fury. 
Despite all these achievements and reciprocal acknowledgements, Ovejas Negras is aware 
of the internal contradictions of the Frente Amplio, which, for example, had a socialist president 
vetoing the decriminalization of abortion, a measure supported by the majority of Frente Amplio 
members and common people, and which would have been a great achievement for the women’s 
movement. I also remember a TV show in which a member of the Movimiento de Participación 
Popular (the biggest fraction of the Frente Amplio today) employed a frightening, anti-urban, 
anti-intellectual and hyper-masculinist discourse: for him, rural areas were the “moral reservoir” 
of the country −in contrast, of course, to the decadent capital. It is quite obvious that this 
politician would oppose any liberal measure in the social arena (he originally belonged to the 
Blanco Party). Examples that illustrate the fragility of the sexual diversity agenda are many. This 
kind of ideological and political “schizophrenia” is understandable, given the careless 
incorporation of new groups and people into the Frente Amplio that was part of its electoral 
strategy. As put by Diego Sempol:  
Liberalism is ready to forget its politics of rights if a conservative alliance with 
the churches gives it electoral advantage. The majority of the left (Movimiento de 
Participación Popular) still thinks that the most important conflict is class 
20 
struggle and all others must be subordinated to it. The Vertiente Artiguista and 
the CAP-L have incorporated this issue [sexual diversity] as central, 
understanding politics from a less traditional perspective, but you know they are 
still a minority within the Frente Amplio. 
This is why Ovejas Negras does not limit its activities to the institutional arena. They not 
only work with other civil society groups, they also have internationalized their action. This is an 
important aspect of their project, both intellectually and practically. The recently created 
Academic Web LGTTB MERCOSUR27 is an expression of this. As one of my interviewers told 
me: “Collaboration with Argentina is very intense. They come to our activities, we participate in 
theirs. We operate together in MERCOSUR”. This articulation has had very concrete effects. I 
was surprised once when Percovich was talking about her own collaboration with an 
Argentinean politician and she added: “Moreover, the LGTTB collectives also have their 
networks in MERCOSUR, and the Ley Concubinaria was drafted with their involvement; they 
informed us of their problems to see how they could be prevented within a new juridical 
framework”.28 As Diego Sempol puts it, “international influence is huge. Ideologically and 
strategically there is a very close relation. There have been articulations within the region since 
the end of the nineties. Contemporary debates are incorporated in our discussions. The most 
influential countries are the United States and Spain and, at the local level, Buenos Aires and Sao 
Paulo”.  
As a sympathizer of Ovejas Negras, I organized a workshop in 2007 on Political Theory 
and its usefulness for queer political action, but I am not so sure about their incorporation of 
“theoretical innovations from around the world”. However, the academic dimension of Ovejas 
Negras was concretized with the creation of the Academic Area29, which organized the first 
Academic Seminar on Sexual Diversity (Montevideo, September 23, 24 and 25 of 2008) in one 
of the most important Public Museums of the country and with the Minister of Culture attending.  
                                                 
27 The Southern Common Market is a customs union among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and, since June 
2006, Venezuela. There are discussions about its potentials and limitations, but it has been incorporated as a 
“cultural-political common space” in the discourse of some social and political actors, as in the next quote.  
28 http://www.sentidog.com/article.php?id_news=22913  
29 http://www.elpais.com.uy/08/09/26/pciuda_372002.asp  
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The most recent action of Ovejas Negras is taking place right now30: the “un beso es un 
beso” (“a kiss is a kiss”) campaign launched on March 23 2009. It is the first of its kind in 
Uruguay.  
Using a simplistic definition of “discrimination”, Uruguay is characterized as a space 
without homophobia. This discourse has some foundation in truth: in Uruguay, if you keep your 
“preference” in the closet, people are very “respectful”. Of course, this implies a kind of cruel 
filter: those who cannot conceal their condition (I am thinking especially of trans-gender people) 
are in trouble. In fact, Montevideo can be the most violent space imaginable in such cases. If you 
are a mainstream gay or lesbian, the social contract implies your invisibilization as such: a kind 
of “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy for the whole country. The “a kiss is a kiss” campaign challenges 
this oppressive social arrangement.31 
3.1 Who is being incorporated? The threats of/to this development 
If our imagined future includes freedom and justice, it is clear that the developments in 
question can be seen as “desirable”. They imply an expansion of public space and the 
empowerment of excluded subjects. They are also changing many individual lives. However, I 
consider it necessary to problematize this process. If, in civil society, sexual diversity issues are 
hegemonized / framed (Laclau and Mouffe, 2004) by leftist understandings (the ideological 
preference of Ovejas Negras leaders), this agenda is being politically appropriated by the most 
moderate side of the Frente Amplio. To caricaturize: the Communist Party works for “the poor” 
from a Ministry especially created for that purpose, while the Vertiente Artiguista works on 
“postmodern” (chic) issues. 
 
 
                                                 
30 April 2009. 
31 As one of my informants commented, “the campaign is doing well (on TV, radio and bus posters). It tries to 
promote visibilization and empowerment, naturalizing what we are required to keep in the closet”. While finishing 
this paper, however, I received notification that the private TV Channel 10 refused to broadcast the campaign spot, 
arguing that it is “too aggressive”. This covert act of discrimination has been denounced by different institutions (the 
Public University, the National Society of Sexology, of course Ovejas Negras, among others). The spot can be seen 
at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tmSpaggU4E8  
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Image 1. The “A kiss is a kiss” campaign 
 
The “gay citizen” fits very well into the traditional symbolic representation of Uruguay as 
an exemplary space –though today this image is not so sustainable. The advanced laws for “gays 
and lesbians” are analogous to those which protected women in the beginning of the 20th 
century: a kind of (neo)neo-Batllismo allied again with civil society against the barbaric right-
wing. I wonder if this reinforces the “metropolitan” representation of queers (Sinfield, 2000), 
which, even if it is not “neoliberalized” (Alexander, 2005) or nationalist (Puar, 2007), carries 
exclusion and violence: queerness is appropriated by those in a specific social location –the 
middle class. 
“I think that policies and politics for Uruguayans have always been designed by/for the 
middle class” (Diego Sempol). However, although the government has developed an enormous 
set of policies for fighting poverty, these excluded at first trans-people (who, in general, have 
incomes below the poverty line) because they were considered to be “single men without 
dependents”. These programs were conceived for “the poor” (presumed to be heterosexual), not 
for “gays” (presumed to belong to the middle-class). Asked about this possible “reduction” of 
queerness and class(ist) bias, Sempol’s answer32 seems to imply that he detects the problem of 
“normalization” from the side of “society” and not in connection to “who is listening” from the 
                                                 
32  “I think that the lesbian-gay was mainstreamed many years ago in certain environments. This is reflected in the 
fact that in some gay night-clubs they do not admit trans-people or members of popular sectors. I think that the 
Ovejas Negras project has this problem with its agenda, and seeks as much as possible to work with trans-people to 
build bridges (…) Our group has a multi-class composition (middle class and popular sectors), but we are trapped by 
the fact that our audience is the classist and racist gay who lives in night-clubs, thinks that his liberation has already 
been achieved, or lives his life with completely individualistic strategies and is unwilling to give anything to 
anyone”. 
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political system. He does not see that “queer rights” are being addressed by the center-left (and, 
therefore, framed by liberal understandings) as “politically problematic”. These dynamics persist 
despite good intentions and have a lot to do with available political spaces and opportunities. 
Ovejas Negras have several initiatives that aim to support the weakest characters in this 
story, and these initiatives are articulated with social leftist forces that call for the redistribution 
of wealth. They take part in the 1st of May (Labor Day) mobilizations, the important march for 
those “disappeared” by the dictatorship, and the main events of the Frente Amplio. 
Legislative demands respond in this case to different social classes. The 
partnership and adoption laws are directed toward the upper and middle classes 
(…) but the bill to change sex registration benefits the trans-population 
exclusively, all of them poor and marginal in Uruguay33. 
However, the best known queer victory is associated with the metropolitan gay: the legal 
recognition of gay couples. It seems that the Uruguayan configuration privileges white middle 
class men. Thus, the way in which this achievement was presented in the media and several 
websites (“in Uruguay it is now possible to be declared ‘husband and husband’”34), and the 
reactivation of a civilized, cultured and respectful imagined space in reality implies silent/subtle 
exclusions in terms of class, race and gender: Queerness is reduced to gayness, and “gayness” is 
not only associated with the middle class (you can be gay if you afford it), but also with a white 
male body. 
If in Toronto the new queer visibility is largely tied to a white male body, in Uruguay those 
“tough geographies” for black queers (Walcott, 2004) are much tougher (racism in Uruguay is 
subtle but strong, and members of the Ovejas Negras are aware of this), and also affect 
mainstream lesbians. In fact, the lgttbq movement has been much more successful than the black 
and women’s movements when it comes to mobilizing people and articulating with the left. 
Collaboration with these other groups is ongoing and relatively fluid. Therefore, I want to 
emphasize that I do not mean to suggest that the actions of the Ovejas Negras tend to be 
                                                 
33 The quote continues: “The aim of this law is to promote social integration, to overcome sanitary and educational 
exclusion, and to increase job opportunities. This project, even though it provokes juridical resistance in some 
deputies, is more likely to touch the hearts of our leftist politicians who still insist on class struggle and social 
marginality”.  
34 http://blogs.20minutos.es/cruzdelsur/post/2007/12/28/en-uruguay-ya-se-pueden-declarar-marido-y-marido  
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exclusive; on the contrary: I think that the incorporation of gayness into the nation is tied to a 
history and a context, and it cannot escape from these assigned meanings35.  
I want to finish with a simple fact: those political forces that are clearly queer-friendly do 
not speak the language of deep social transformation. I agree with Sempol regarding the 
importance of the expansion of the political realm/agenda, but to do so it is not necessary to shift 
to the center. The rejection of socialism erodes the core (or at least part of it) of an emancipatory 
project still sustained, for example, by the (homophobic) Communist Party. Paradoxically, if 
                                                 
35 On the struggles and contradictions of a queer diasporic Uruguayan academic subject. Re-presentations, 
power and radical-self reflection: 
The title of this note may sound pretentious. In fact, it does to me. However, it expresses accurately what I need to 
say. When I arrived in Toronto some months ago, I was shocked by the fact that Latin America is considered “non-
Western” in Canada. We are “other” and the othering of us is something that takes place constantly, even in the most 
progressive intellectual environments. I used to say that progressive Canadians seem to need an imagined “other” to 
help, to understand, and to protect in order to reproduce certain relations of power while retaining the status of being 
“progressive”. Something has to be said about positionality here: when Latin Americans talk about the continent as a 
unity, we acknowledge a common history of colonialism, neoliberalism and oppression. But when the place of 
enunciation is the “Global North” and there are references to (for example) “Latin American homosexuality”, the 
discursive effect is very different.  
“We” (Latin Americans), have to remain in that different symbolic space. I used to be angry with ignorance about 
Latin America´s diversity, something that does not fit that homogeneous imagined space. The reality of Uruguay 
and Argentina, for example, does not fit the dominant Canadian representation of Latin America. And it seems to be 
“boring” or uninteresting to analyze someone who, being similar to you, challenges your self-conception as being a 
“privileged Westerner”. What happens when the other appears similar to you? I wondered many times if the 
revaluing of supposed non-Western cultures by progressive Canadians operates, at least in some cases, as a device of 
power. After thinking long about the issue, I arrived at a tentative answer: yes and no. My own defensiveness was 
implicated in what I was criticizing – a double-edged knife.  
Founded on the “absence” of aboriginals, Uruguay is somehow the perfect colonized space, even more so than 
Canada and the United States, which, because they are rich, are “Western” even though they were colonies too. 
They still have aboriginal peoples who remind them that “they were there first”. In Uruguay there are no aboriginal 
people (or almost none). They were exterminated both physically and symbolically. Few voices support the memory 
of the genocide. While Bolivia, after years of popular struggle, recently has approved a new Constitution that 
acknowledges its multinational character, in Uruguay that would be impossible... Many scholars and common 
citizens argue that Uruguayans are homogeneous (although from diverse European backgrounds), and that the theme 
of (post)colonialism (in terms of “race”) does not apply. However, the paradox is that this is true because the 
colonial project was completed in hands of the criollos in the 19th century: it was Uruguayans who killed the 
aboriginal people.  
Colonialism is about “race” and political economy (Alexander, 2005): in Canada we are not considered “Western” 
(a shocking surprise for a lot of Uruguayans) and in Spain we are humiliated and attacked (not surprising 
considering the intense contact with Spain). Our imposed Mother rejects us. Spain-Europe landed in Latin America 
five hundred years ago, finding gold to extract and people to exploit, and now they close their borders and (again) 
kill whoever tries to cross them. The US, which trained our military to torture, to disappear and to murder, and 
which supported the cruellest regime in Uruguayan history, asks us for visas.  
Both the queer and the leftist project, even if the articulation between them succeeds, will remain incomplete if they 
do not address the (neo)colonial and racist dimension of Uruguayan society. 
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Ovejas Negras has “framed” and “hegemonized” sexual diversity issues in leftist terms, building 
articulations that are not “natural” or “necessary” between different identities and claims, and if 
in the Pride March people remember the dark times of the dictatorship and talk about socialism, 
the incorporation of queerness into the political system is being accomplished by forces that do 
not fight for the goal without which “complete queerness” is unthinkable: a radical political 
future beyond exploitation and commodification.  
4. Conclusion: Queer or class struggle? 
Slavoj Zizek (Butler, Laclau and Zizek: 2003), reproducing the logic of a joke from a Marx 
Brothers’ film, asks: “Postmodernism or class struggle?” and answers: “Yes, please!” Now I am 
“stealing his theft” in my subtitle above. Is this other articulation possible? Can we answer “Yes, 
please!” going beyond the intellectual and political structures and limitations of these theoretical 
times −and even expanding our notion of “Uruguayan identity”?  
 In any case, if our collective goal is to imagine and build a radical political future, the 
desirable queer subject should not be neoliberalized or social-democratized −that is, he/she 
should not be comfortably allocated to the symbolic space owned by a “progressive”, 
professional middle class within a renewed (though incomplete) social-democratic formation. 
The latter, of course, is politically seductive, since it speaks the language of metropolitan global 
gay identity (Sinfield, 2000; Alexander, 2005), articulating it with Uruguay’s state-centered 
political culture and Uruguayans’ (homogenizing) egalitarian self-image (Filgueira, Garcé, 
Ramos and Yaffé: 2003; Moreira at all, 2008; Rama, 1989; Real de Azúa, 1984, among others). 
In addition, in the context of the battle against global capital, and considering the harmful effects 
of neoliberal policies in the region, social democracy does not look bad –this is understandable!  
 However, I want to make explicit my concern regarding the fullest implications of the 
possible configuration of a center−left gay subject within the context of this neo-neo-batllista 
(poor neo-social democrat) formation: the obliteration of the fight for the queering of socialism –
a struggle in which leftist parties and movements remain on the left and do not forget about class 
struggle, and in which queers are neither imagined as picky (neoliberal) consumers nor as 
members of a compassionate and cultured progressive middle class. In Uruguay, this implies the 
encounter of the most radical forces of the Frente Amplio and the queer movements –and the 
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creation of a political discourse in which queer issues do not substitute for class struggle, and in 
which class struggle (finally!) does not imply homophobia.   
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